As the electoral impasse in Somalia enters a dangerous territory, we need to take a step back and think about how we got here, what animates the main camps, what the stakes are, and the lasting effects of this problem.
Background
In 2017, the then-President Hassan Sheikh lost the election despite funding most winning parliamentary candidates and paying them off again the night before election day. Here was a lesson: one needed something more than money to secure votes. The clue was in the winning strategy adopted by Farmajo in 2017: paint your opponents as puppets of foreigners and yourself as a patriotic nationalist. If one could engineer an election system that produced voters and MPs that already believed in your claims, then your victory would be all but assured.
The initial plan was to hold direct elections in 2020/21, challenging the tried method of vote-buying. Because bribing all voters would be prohibitively expensive, the actions taken by the administration show that it was laying the groundwork for indirect elections since 2018. To consolidate its control at the FGS and the FMSs, Farmajo's administration engineered the removal of the Speaker of the House in 2018 and secured the elections of its chosen candidates in Southwest State, Galmudug, and HirShabelle. All wins were preceded by violence and the use of government forces to put down legitimate political opposition. It lost in Puntland and Jubbaland, partly because it could not deploy its forces where voting was taking place..
The idea is that, if one controls an FMS, one can engineer the parliamentary elections there and, by extension, decide who wins the presidency. Dirty games were employed in the last indirect election of 2016/17, and it is expected that the same will be true this time round as well: selecting voters that favour one candidate over another, by paying off the elder whose job it is to select voters; switching voters and holding polls at odd hours or on Fridays; and disqualifying candidates by assigning their seats exclusively to female candidates -- basically using the supposedly progressive female quota as a tool to get rid of opponents who are popular with their communities and elders. These are just a few of the schemes that were employed in 2016/17 . Sweetening the deals with monetary payoffs were just the cherry on top of that corruption cake. The elections of 2021 were going to be 2016/17, but with more predictable results.
Following the 14 October 2017 attack, an opportunity presented itself. There was a massive swelling of public anger that could be utilised to create a voting bloc in the incumbent’s favour. To consolidate its support base, the administration created what it called Xoogagga Waddaniyiinta, "Nationalist Forces (NF)". Their total strength is not clear, but they number 15-20 thousand in Mogadishu alone, according to officials in the Banadir Regional Administration. For now, they mob opposition members online, inundating comment sections with support for the president and engaging in vile insults against the opposition. Others hold district, regional, and federal positions. Others were drafted into the security forces.
Early on, it was clear that much of the re-election plan would rest on having security forces and commanders loyal to the president, not to their clans or to FMSs. To that end, officials seen to favour a security architecture that gave weight to the FMSs were side-lined; commanders willing to act against prominent politicians were empowered; and loyalists were installed at NISA and the SNA. Commando forces trained to fight Al-Shabab were deployed to prop up regional allies of the president and intimidate his opposition.
Controlling the FMSs that have the plurality of MPs, the voters necessary to elect said MPS, the electoral technical teams, and the security forces, Farmajo was headed for coronation. His only obstacles were the political opposition in Mogadishu, PL, and JL.
The pieces fall into place
Meanwhile, the opposition was counting on President Farmajo's term ending on 8 February, creating a perfect excuse to demand that he step aside and be uninvolved in the electoral process. The opposition had done everything to run the clock out on Farmajo, even holding celebrations in Mogadishu on the night of 8 February, marking the end of his constitutional term. However, it seems that they did not read the 26 September 2020 law that was supposed to approve the 17 September election agreement but included an article indefinitely extending the term of the president. According to that law, the term of the president and the parliament ends when elections are held, in effect removing any sense of urgency to hold elections by an incumbent administration.
The current strategy of the opposition is to delegitimise Farmajo by continuing to hold demonstrations that they know will be met by force. From the point of view of Farmajo, massive demonstrations risk weakening the narrative he has created that “a few men” are against him and that he has overwhelming support. He will continue to close off roads and use live bullets to disperse protesters to protect his image. His actions on 19 February brought to the surface the opposition’s ultimate demand: that he not run for president, and that they would boycott the elections if he ran.
The current impasse may end in a limited concession by the administration: it may allow the demonstrations to go ahead but close off all the roads. We might really witness a few men protesting, weakening the opposition’s claim that its stronghold is in Mogadishu. Farmajo is desperate to hold elections he knows he will win, according to his calculation.
The NF is central to Farmajo’s plan. The pro-Farmajo NF is represented in the electoral technical teams at the federal and regional levels. The opposition fears that this is how the president will engineer his win:
1. His people at the technical teams will ensure that the NF will be the electors for every MP in the four FMSs of GM, SWS, HS, and Somaliland (SL “elections” are held in Mogadishu).
2. The electors and winning candidates from the four FMSs above will be from the NF.
3. These FMS have more than 2/3 of all MPs, ensuring Farmajo's win in a landslide.
In short, the opposition wants technical teams that are independent, but the government wants to engineer a sure win as it did with the three southern FMSs.
The consequences
The effects of the current impasse depend on the actions taken to overcome it. If an agreement is rammed through by international pressure without levelling the playing field and/or combating the multi-layered rigging scheme built by the incumbent, the opposition may boycott the process, thereby keeping Farmajo indefinitely in office. While the only positive action by the international community in this saga was in stopping Farmajo from holding elections without PL and JL, this ensures that elections are not held soon because these FMSs are unlikely to accept elections in the current climate.
If the government continues to use force to assert itself and deny the opposition its basic constitutional rights to assemble peacefully, we might be witnessing the beginning of the disintegration of the legitimacy of the nascent federal state. While it was common for pro-govt clan militias to be engaged in infighting, we have never seen a rejection of the authority of the state before this month. No non-AS party has dared shoot at government forces — this might change now. We might lose many years of state building if this is let to fester. Somali elites, especially in the north and in Mogadishu, were always weary of a force that is not clan based, because of their experience with a "national army" that bombed and raped across central and northern Somalia in the 1980s. Their greatest fears are coming to life now, seeing how a non-clan army is being used, not for national security, but for regime security. Nothing is more dangerous to the viability of a national military today than Farmajo's electioneering. How can local and regional politicians trust a force that they cannot expect to respect the constitution, let alone local customs that are the basis of legitimacy?
Resistance to the creation of a national security architecture will be entrenched and continued to be viewed with suspicion. As a result, unity of effort in the war on terror will be lost, and we will continue to witness the strengthening of Al-Shabab and weakening of the FGS and the FMSs the former has undermined with its constant interference.
Well articulated paper of cussrent situation and I see alot of outstanding recommendations.
A thought-provoking, informative article but pretty much sad to know the depth of horror reality in the country, May Allah protect our country. Thanks!